




Biolinguistics 6.3–4: 475–490, 2012 
ISSN 1450–341       http://www.biolinguistics.eu 
The Language of Colour: 





It is often claimed, following Joseph Levine, that there is an ‘explanatory 
gap’ between ordinary physical facts and the way we perceive things, so 
that it is impossible to explain, among other things, why colours actually 
look the way they do. C.L. Hardin, by contrast, argues that there are suffici-
ent asymmetries between colours to traverse this gap. This paper argues that 
the terms we use to characterize colours, such as ‘warm’ and ‘cool’, are not 
well understood, and that we need to understand the neurological basis for 
such associations if we are even to understand what is fully meant by 
saying, for example, that red is a warm colour. This paper also speculates on 
how Hardin’s strategy can be generalized. 
 
 








A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why mental states have the 
phenomenal qualities that they do. It is often held, for example, by Joseph Levine 
(1983, 1991), that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ here. The simplest such states are 
perceptual qualia, and the examples most commonly chosen are colour qualia. 
Even if we knew everything about the physics of colour, and even if we knew 
everything about the eye and the brain, this would not explain why colours 
actually look the way they do, why green stimuli give rise to green qualia, for 
example, as opposed to red ones. This is perhaps because colours are essentially 
ineffable — simple impressions, in Hume’s (1955) sense, which cannot be charac-
terized in any useful way. 
 However, some (such as C.L. Hardin 1987, 1988, 1997) take a more optimis-
tic line, and argue that there are enough asymmetries within the colour circle to 
ensure that it is possible to explain why colours look the way they do. In parti-
cular, any possible inverted spectrum (seeing green where others see red, for 
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example) can be ruled out as detectable after all. More generally, colour vision 
science shows there to be many useful connections between phenomenology and 
physiology. For example, that red is (unlike orange) a unique (i.e. unmixed) hue, 
and unlike green, a positive, advancing, and warm hue, can perhaps be explained 
physiologically. However, attention needs to be directed to exactly how these 
italicized predicates — the language of colour — get their meanings. It will be 
argued that we need to have predicates of this kind if explanations of why 
colours look the way they do are to be forthcoming, and we are not to surrender 
to the claim of simple ineffability. It will also be argued that such terms are more 
than just metaphorical, and that they directly concern how the brain itself works, 
and thus involve a kind of embodiment of language, one which challenges more 
traditional pictures of how language works.  
 I shall argue that an ideal sort of explanation of why red should look warm 
is that there be some appropriate neurological connections between the visual 
and tactile parts of the brain (currently, the issue is undecided). This will link 
visual and tactile warmth in a way that is too direct to be merely metaphorical, 
but not so simply as to yield literal synonymy. Redness is not wholly ineffable, 
but not straightforwardly analysable either. However, red–green inversion is not 
the only inversion that needs to be ruled out. Other terms are needed, and I 
suggest that greens and yellows have a quality that may be described as sharp, 
fresh and citrusy whereas reds, blues and purples do not. As with warm, this 
quality does more than just reflect ordinary physical associations (I think). To 
explain this, we need to find direct neural links between the visual and gustatory 
centres of the brain. This needs to be further generalized, and I shall speculate on 




2. The Hering Colour Circle 
 
Hardin draws heavily on the ideas of the 19th century physiologist and founder 
of modern colour vision science, Ewald Hering. Conventional wisdom says that 
there are only three basic colours (red, green and blue) from which all others can 
be obtained by mixture, and that this corresponds to the fact that there are three 
different kinds of colour photoreceptor in the retina (sometimes known, rather 
misleadingly, as the red, green, and blue cones1) which respond to different parts 
of the visible spectrum. Hering, however, insisted that there are four unique 
hues, that is to say, colours which actually look essentially unmixed, namely red, 
yellow, green, and blue. These yield four binary or essentially mixed hues, 
namely orange (red–yellow), purple (blue–red), turquoise (green–blue), and char-
treuse (yellow–green). This notion of mixture is purely phenomenal, and does 
not relate to how colours may be obtained by combining lights or pigments. We 
now know that the phenomenon to which Hering draws our attention is post-
                                                
    1 The terms are misleading since the cones’ sensitivity curves do not peak at the red, green 
and blue portions of the spectrum: The ‘red’ cone peaks at yellow-green, and it is the narrow 
difference in stimulation level between it and the ‘green’ cone that underpins the red–green 
perceptual channel. 
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receptoral, and concerns how differences in stimulation level in the cones are 
transmitted to the visual cortex. Specifically, there are two retinocortical 
channels, the red–green channel and the yellow–blue channel (together with the 
achromatic white–black channel), each of which yields opponent processing. 
Thus when the first channel is excited, the subject perceives red or a reddish hue; 
when it is inhibited, the subject perceives green or a greenish hue. Likewise, 
when the second channel is excited, the subject perceives yellow or a yellowish 
hue; when it is inhibited, the subject perceives blue or a bluish hue. The results 





















Figure 1:  The Hering colour circle 
 
Two classes of phenomenal facts are explained by this analysis. Firstly, 
the difference between unique and binary hues is accounted for. Colours which 
look essentially unique and unmixed correspond to the activation of just one 
retinocortical channel, whereas colours which look like mixtures of unique hues 
correspond to the activation of two. Secondly, we can see why some 
combinations of unique hues are perceptually impossible, namely red–green and 
yellow–blue.2 This is because a given channel cannot simultaneously be excited 
and inhibited, any more than a given energy level can simultaneously increase 
and decrease. As Hering originally predicted, much of the phenomenology of 
colour perception, that is to say much of what directly presents itself to the 
colour-sighted percipient, is matched by the underlying physiology, and in a 
very straightforward sort of way.3 The explanatory gap has not been completely 
traversed, to be sure, since there are many other phenomenological facts yet to be 
                                                
    2 Except in extraordinary circumstances. On this, see Crane & Piantanida (1983), Billock et al. 
(2001), and Suarez & Nida-Rümelin (2009). 
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explained, but the idea that such a gap is untraversable in principle has been put 
into serious doubt. 
 Closely connected to the explanatory gap is the hypothesis of inverted 
qualia, namely that it is possible that you see colours differently from me (see the 
Appendix for an illustration of this phenomenon). Hardin argues against Levine 
that there are enough asymmetries in the colour circle depicted above to rule this 
out. In particular, it is highly implausible that you might see orange where I see 
red since what you would call ‘red’ (namely orange) is a binary hue and can be 
directly perceived as such. If there are to be any undetectable inversions, then at 
the very least, unique hues must be exchanged with other unique hues. The 
standard inversion scenario invokes an exchange of red and green, thus leading 
to a reflection of the colour circle in the vertical diameter. However, Hardin 
argues that such an inversion is also detectable since red and yellow are 
essentially warm hues, whereas green and blue are essentially cool hues; and this 
too is explicable physiologically. This is much more controversial, however, and 
this paper argues that this is largely because terms like ‘warm’ and ‘cool’, as used 
in this context, are not well understood. 
 
 
3. Word/Colour Associations 
 
What do we mean when we say that red is a warm colour? One problem is that 
ordinary physical associations are involved. As is often observed, reds and 
yellows are the colours of fire, whereas greens and blues are the colours of lakes. 
Obviously, red is a fiery colour, for example, but people with red–green inverted 
qualia will also agree: (What we call) green is indeed, for them, a colour of fire! 
Many will insist that this sort of thing is all that the warmth/coolness distinction 
amounts to, and that they cannot see anything more directly phenomenological 
involved. The fact that there is this sort of disagreement here is embarrassing, 
and weakens a lot of ordinary phenomenological evidence, for it undermines the 
assumption that we can all tell, without too much difficulty, how things look to 
us. At any rate, if it turns out that ordinary physical associations (together with 
some additional cultural conventions, perhaps) accounts entirely for the warm–
cool distinction, then it cannot be used to explain why red looks like red as 
opposed to green. But we do not ordinarily suppose that a blue gas flame looks 
warm even though it feels it, and there is evidence that people really do perceive 
a genuine phenomenological distinction here. For example, Katra & Wooten, in a 
recent unpublished study (quoted in Hardin 1997), asked ten subjects to rate 
eight colour samples as ‘warm’ or ‘cool’ on a ten-point scale, with ten as ‘very 
warm.’ The mean results gave the lowest rating to the blue sample, and the 
highest rating to the orange sample. There was a high level of agreement among 
subjects: 
 
The remarkable correspondence between the obtained ratings of warmth 
and coolness and the activation levels in the opponent channels […] 
suggests that the attribution of thermal properties to colors may be linked to 
the low-level physiological processes involved in color perception. Higher 
ratings of warmth corresponded with levels of activation of the opponent 
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channels in one direction, while cooler ratings corresponded with activation 
in the opposite direction. This suggests that a link to the activation level of 
the opponent channels, rather than the psychological quality of hue, drives 
the association of temperature with color, and that the association is more 
than simply a cognitive process.  
 
Also, Ou et al. (2004) showed:  
 
[I]n a psychophysical experiment, 31 observers, including 14 British and 17 
Chinese subjects assessed 20 colours on 10 colour-emotion scales: warm–
cool, heavy–light, modern–classical, clean–dirty, active–passive, hard–soft, 
tense–relaxed, fresh–stale, masculine–feminine, and like–dislike. 
Experimental results show no significant difference between male and 
female data, whereas different results were found between British and 
Chinese observers for the tense–relaxed and like–dislike scales. […] Four 
colour-emotion models were developed, including warm–cool, heavy–light, 
active–passive, and hard–soft. […] The results show that for each colour 
emotion the models of the three studies agreed with each other, suggesting 
that the four colour emotions are culture-independent across countries.4 
 
 So, suppose that there really is a relevant sort of distinction here.5 How will 
it help us? Levine argues, against Hardin, that although warmth is connected to 
redness, the connection is essentially shallow. The former could be subtracted 
from the latter to yield a residue, a ‘cool red’. If this is right, then we do indeed 
have an explanatory problem since we have not managed to target what is 
essential to red. But Hardin rejects the intelligibility of ‘cool red’, and surely 
rightly so. What we call visual warmth does seem to be an essential part of 
redness. It is not all of redness, to be sure, otherwise yellow could not also be 
warm, so it is possible that a residue exists.6 But this residue is only half a colour, 
not a purified red. Should the residue be combined with coolness to produce a 
new hue, what we would end up with would be something wholly alien and 
unimaginable, not anything that much resembles red. Appeals to warmth will 
not explain everything about why red looks the way it does, of course, but it 
surely can be used to explain something. In particular, if it can be shown that 
there are some direct links of an appropriate kind between the neurons which fire 
when we see red (and yellow) and those which fire when we feel warmth, then 
an explanation is well on its way.  
Such neurological connections need to be found, of course, but their 
elusiveness is not the only obstacle to explanatory success. There remains another 
inverted qualia scenario that needs to be ruled out, which I call ‘diagonal 
inversion’, namely one which involves reflection in the dotted diagonal axis of 
the Hering colour circle depicted above, where red is exchanged with yellow and 
                                                
    4 Quoted from the Abstract. 
    5 A negative result here is that young children are less inclined to associate red with warmth, 
which suggests that the connection is cultural and learnt, not biological. See Morgan et al. 
(1975). The suggestion is not conclusive, however, since innate connections can take time to 
develop. It is nevertheless odd to suppose that children see colours differently from adults. 
    6 Though even this is unobvious. Just because being coloured is a part of being red, for 
example, it does not follow that there is a residue, namely a quality which remains when we 
subtract colouredness from redness.  
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green with blue. Turquoise and orange stay fixed, and purple is exchanged with 
its complement, chartreuse.7 How could we extend the warmth-coolness point to 
handle this? Many people I have asked agree that greens and yellows have a 
quality that may be described as ‘sharp’, ‘fresh’, and ‘citrusy’ — whereas reds, 
blues, and purples do not. Obviously, there is the risk, once again, that we are 
dealing only with familiar physical associations here, since limes are green and 
lemons are yellow. But blackcurrants also have a sharp and citrusy taste, but do 
not look to me (at any rate) sharp or citrusy. On the contrary, the pale mauve of a 
blackcurrant yoghurt looks like the very opposite of a sharp, fresh, or citrusy 
colour. By contrast, lemons and limes not only taste sharp, fresh; and citrusy — 
they look that way as well. At least, they do to me, though I have only rather 
limited evidence that they do to others as well. The very fact that the matter is 
hard to settle indicates that the semantics of words such as ‘warm’, ‘cool’, ‘sharp’, 
‘fresh’, and ‘citrusy’ (the language of colour) needs considerable critical attention 
if the explanatory gap is to be traversed successfully. 
 There has been plenty of research done on words apart from ‘warm’ and 
‘cool’ that we might associate with different colours (though they do not illumi-
nate the case of diagonal inversion). For example, Lars Sivik (1997: 187), when 
developing the Swedish Natural Colour System (NCS), discovered that: 
 
[t]here are many words in common use to describe the character and 
associative meanings of colours. Besides such attributes as yellow, blue, 
strong, weak, deep, and saturated, colours can also have connotations like 
cold, joyful, depressing, sick, healthy, dirty, feminine, masculine, etc. Such 
colour-relevant adjectives can add up to a rather long list. It is now possible 
to make a semantic map from the average judgements for each of all 
imaginable words, or for pairs of opposites if we choose to use bi-polar 
scales as in the masculine–feminine example above. In our first studies 
(Sivik 1970), twenty-seven such antonyms were mapped out in the NCS. 
 
These results concern all colours, including browns and greys, not just maximally 
saturated hues (which are what I have been considering). Whether, and to what 
extent, these colour/word connections yield explanations will depend on just 
why they come about. Unless they relate to intrinsic phenomenological facts, 
rather than external associations, they will probably not be significant if only 
                                                
    7 Some rule out this possibility on the grounds that yellow is a much lighter colour then red, 
and also that there are more perceptual differences between red and blue than there are 
between yellow and green (see, e.g., Hardin 1988: 134–42, and Palmer 1999). However, these 
facts relate not to hue but to chroma, or saturation level, and hue and chroma are usually 
thought of as independent dimensions of colour, fact that is directly, visibly evident to us; so 
it is unclear if such asymmetries are really explanatory in any relevant way. That yellow has 
a very low chromatic content is easily explained by the fact that it occurs in the middle of 
the visible spectrum, where the light-dark sensitivity curve peaks. Green also has a lower 
chromatic content than red or blue. These facts might change for a ‘diagonally inverted’ per-
cipient, who might be able to perceive a ‘supersaturated yellow’, a colour which relates to 
yellow as red relates to pink (and who would be unable to perceive a ‘supersaturated pink’, 
i.e. what we call ‘red’). Supersaturated yellow is unimaginable to us, but does not seem 
paradoxical in the way in which Levine’s ‘cool red’ is, since it merely involves stretching 
things a bit. We have no idea how many perceptible differences there are between green and 
supersaturated yellow. For more on this, see Unwin (2011). 
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because they will not differentiate between the experiences of normal percipients 
and those of colour-inverted percipients. Without such deep links, colours will 
remain essentially ineffable, and hence unexplainable. It is difficult to see what 
research could be done that would decide the matter, since it would have to rely 
very heavily on asking somewhat technical questions of naive subjects. However, 
the main focus of this paper concerns what we are saying when we say that red is 
a warm colour, and which perhaps we are not saying when we say that pink is a 
feminine colour, and this contrast is in itself rather hard to analyse. 
 So what sort of claim are we making when we say that red is a warm 
colour? It might be thought that the term ‘warm’ is purely metaphorical here, as 
in a ‘warm’ greeting. However, this does not seem to do justice to the force with 
which the warmth strikes us. Metaphors are things that we can usually take or 
leave, and although they can sometimes be very striking, they do not seem to 
relate to intrinsic character in a sufficiently robust sort of way. It is, after all, 
meant to be a primitive phenomenological fact that red looks warm, so primitive 
that if something fails to look warm then it necessarily fails to look red. It might 
be thought, on the other hand, that the term is simply literal: Red is just literally 
warm. This, however, is also unsatisfactory as it fails to do justice to the differ-
ences in the sensory modalities and associated secondary qualities. True, we de-
scribe chillies as ‘hot’ and this seems literally (i.e. not just metaphorically) right as 
far as appearances go, despite the fact that we are referring to flavour rather than 
an ordinary tactile sensation caused by a rise in temperature; but gustatory heat, 
or piquancy, is not strictly speaking a taste in the way in which sweetness, 
sourness, and so forth are tastes, since it is carried to the brain by a different set of 
nerves. Flavour is a complex intermodal sense, and should be distinguished from 
pure taste. Moreover, piquancy does relate very closely to an ordinary burning 
sensation on the tongue even if it is not accompanied by a rise in temperature. 
The reason is that similar things are happening to the tongue in each case. By 
contrast, warmth does not seem to relate to redness in this direct sort of way: The 
resemblance is not sufficiently close. What we seem to have, therefore, is some-
thing in between literal synonymy and metaphor. This in itself yields a problem, 
since it is unclear what that amounts to. True, we are familiar with dead meta-
phors, which are half way between real metaphors and literal meanings, but this 
again does not seem to be the sort of thing we should be looking for. 
 Finding generally agreed associations between colours and particular 
words is evidently not enough to yield interesting explanations of why colours 
look the way they do, if only because it needs to be shown that the meanings of 
the words in question attach themselves sufficiently deeply to the phenomeno-
logy. To some extent, cultural associations can be identified and used to screen 
the reliability of such associations. For example, we need not attach much signi-
ficance to the connection between the colour pink and the word ‘feminine’, if 
only because the association is comparatively recent and does not extend across 
all cultures. But it may be hard to generalize this kind of screening technique, and 
Sivik’s research in developing the NCS yields a bewildering array of terms and 
associations. Much work has been done in configuring semantic scales and devel-
oping the topography of associations, but the issue of explanation, of just why 
certain colours (or colour combinations) should be thought of as ‘mighty’ or 
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‘militaristic’, for example, is not easy to address. 
 
 
4 The Role of Neurology 
 
A more promising locus of explanation is the brain, but here we also have 
difficulties. I suggested, following Hardin (1988: 129–84), that there might be sig-
nificant links between those neurons which fire when we see reds and yellows on 
the one hand, and those which fire when we perceive tactile warmth on the other. 
There is currently not much evidence for this, but the crucial point is that if such 
links were to exist, then we would have something which is genuinely explana-
tory; and conversely, without such links, it is hard to see how any useful explan-
ation (i.e. one which addresses the explanatory gap) can exist. This is of philoso-
phical importance even if it is purely speculative. I suggest that it would do more 
than just explain why warmth is associated with reds and yellows; it would also 
reinforce the claim that reds and yellows really do look intrinsically warm, and 
would help us to answer the doubters who claim that they cannot see any such 
intrinsic warmth, and that we are dealing only with physical and cultural asso-
ciations. This might seem paradoxical: Surely, it may be said, the explanandum 
needs to be firmly in place before we look for the explanans. Specifically, we must 
be confident that red really does look intrinsically warm (and hence know what 
this means) before asking why this should be so. In response, I can say that in my 
own case, I was disinclined to believe that red was intrinsically warm until the 
possibility of a neurologically grounded intermodal link was suggested to me: 
Until then, I could not see clearly what could even be meant by the claim. Merely 
saying that seeing red and feeling warmth resemble each other is not enough: 
Unlike the case of piquancy, the resemblance itself is not strong enough to 
underpin the claim.8 
 Some qualification is needed here. I am not suggesting that all of what is 
meant by saying that red is a warm colour is that there are appropriate inter-
modal neural links, still less that the unknown details should form part of the 
meaning of what we are currently saying. Since the links are required to explain 
the resemblance, we would otherwise run the risk that explanans and explanandum 
will coalesce, thus rendering the explanation trivial: That is to say, we end up 
saying that the existence of certain intermodal neural links explains why there 
are certain intermodal neural links. Rather, the neurological claim — or at the 
very least the weaker and physically non-specific claim that there is an important, 
deep link within the internal processing mechanisms involved in seeing red and 
feeling warmth (without the details) — should be part of what elucidates the 
particular sort of resemblance between redness and warmth that we are trying to 
explain. The explanation itself then consists in filling in the details. There may 
remain a kind of circularity here, but it is relatively harmless. It does, however, 
ensure that questions of meaning — i.e. questions about what we are actually 
                                                
    8 However, Austen Clark (1993, 1994) has argued that such resemblances across our whole 
quality space, together with neural links, yields a sufficiently asymmetrical system that they 
yield a full physicalist reduction of all our sensory qualities. For a critique of Clark, see 
Unwin (2011). 
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saying when we say that red looks warm — remain prominent. 
 Nevertheless, it might still be wondered whether we really need to talk 
about the language of colour at all. After all, nonhuman animals have colour 
vision, and presumably there can be intermodal links there as well. Perhaps red 
rags present a warm sort of visual sensation to bulls which blue or green rags do 
not do. At any rate, it is certainly possible for certain wavelengths of incoming 
light to be more arousing than others, as they are in humans, and we do not need 
to ask about the bull’s colour vocabulary or cross-modal linguistic associations in 
order to establish this. Furthermore, it is often said, following Thomas Nagel 
(1979), that we have no conception of what nonhuman qualia can be like, and this 
fact is itself often used as an argument against physicalism and in favour of there 
being an untraversable explanatory gap. But here, as elsewhere, the point can be 
exaggerated. If we suppose, for the sake of argument, that bulls are aroused more 
by red rags than by blue ones, then it is reasonable to infer that the hue perceived 
in the former case more closely resembles human red than blue. This is because 
red light is more arousing than blue. This conclusion can only be tentative, of 
course, but it would be reinforced if it could be shown that there are further 
physiological resemblances between bulls’ brains and human ones. Yet once 
again, the specific issue of language seems to have dropped out of the picture, and 
the suspicion may be that it should never have been in the picture in the first 
place. 
 However, this would be a mistake. We need to consider other terms besides 
‘warm’ and ‘cool’ if we are to generalize this strategy, as we need to do if we are 
to handle diagonal inversion, for example, and the only realistic way to tell 
whether people perceive certain intermodal resemblances is to ask whether 
certain words are associated with certain colours. This, at least, must be our first 
line of inquiry. We then need to filter out the external or culturally-driven 
associations by focusing on what may be intrinsic to the sensory processing itself. 
What seems to follow, then, is that the terms we use to characterize the pheno-
menology of colours are themselves closely connected to what goes on in the 
brain. Colour language is thus, in a sense, embodied, and cannot be studied 
independently from bodily functioning, in particular, brain activity. If we neglect 
the language, then we lack the means to test — or even to look for — hypotheses 
about intersensory connections; and if we neglect the embodiment, then we fail to 
distinguish the intrinsic language of colour from the much looser web of associ-





What further empirical research is needed? Ideally, we should like to hear from 
people who view the world through hue-inverting spectacles, especially those 
who have worn them from birth! If people who have always worn red–green 
inverting spectacles judge that (what we call) red things look warm and green 
things look cool, then our thesis is seriously undermined, but is confirmed if they 
make opposite judgements. We can likewise ask if diagonally inverted percipi-
ents associate the terms ‘sharp’, ‘fresh’, and ‘citrusy’ with colours in the same 
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way as the rest of us. We can also ask people who try on any kind of hue-
inverting spectacles in midlife whether after a time things start to look as they 
did before (compare this with studies that show that people acclimatize 
gradually to up–down inverting spectacles). If so, then the whole notion of a 
colour quale will be placed in jeopardy; but it would also suggest, and for just that 
reason, that we do not have the kind of explanatory gap that provoked the 
discussion in the first place. In the absence of the necessary technology, more 
down-to-earth studies of the kind undertaken by Sivik, Katra and Wooten, and 
others are desirable, where normal subjects are asked how well they think a 
given term is associated with a given colour. But terms may need to be restricted 
to phenomenal terms relating to non-visual senses (it is unclear how else to guard 
against irrelevant external associations). We also need to learn more about inter-
sensory connections in general, and research on synaesthesia may be of help 
here.9 With such research in place, we are better able to see if the brain con-
nections mirror the sensory associations.  
 What of the philosophical conclusions, in particular with regard to the 
explanatory gap? It should be noted that no attempt has been made to close the 
gap completely, and it is hard to see how to do this. Explanations tend to be 
contrastive, and there are too many potential contrasts. That is to say, instead of 
simply asking questions of the form ‘Why X?’ we tend to ask questions of the 
form ‘Why X as opposed to Y?’, and there are too many candidates for ‘Y’ here. 
Even if we can explain why green looks like green as opposed to red (we can talk 
about warmth and coolness), that will not explain why green looks like green as 
opposed to blue. I have suggested ways in which we could extend a similar type 
of explanation here; but even if that were successful, it would not explain why 
green looks like green as opposed to some wholly alien hue, such as Levine’s 
‘cool red’, for example. Nor does it address David Chalmers’s (1996) ‘hard 
problem’, namely of why green should look like green as opposed to nothing at 
all (more generally, why physical processes should give rise to any qualia of any 
kind in the first place). But the ‘hard problem’ is not the only problem of interest, 
and explanatoriness comes in degrees. Just because we have failed to explain 
everything, it does not follow that we have explained nothing, and we should not 
belittle the significance of coming to understand how and why our ordinary 
colour vocabulary links with other sensory words. And brain processes certainly 
play an explanatory role here, even if the mind–body problem remains alive and 
unsolved. 
 
                                                
    9 It is often said that we are all weak synaesthetes, and this weak synaesthesia is evidently 
crucial to the Hardin strategy for traversing the explanatory gap. Full-blown synaesthesia is 
evidently irrelevant to such a project if only because there is such variation between subjects 
as to how different modalities connect. However, Marks (1978: 218–20) claims that synaes-
thesia is not what is at stake here. 
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